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1. Introduction
This article aims to analyze the dynamics of strategic competition between the United States and China, as well as its effects in Central America. Within this framework, the security dimension will be examined from a methodological perspective that takes as reference both China’s 2022 “Global Security Initiative”-understood as a narrative that challenges the dominant Western perspective-and its impact on the development of security cooperation dynamics with countries in the region.
As part of the methodological process, a critical content analysis of the Global Security Initiative was conducted to identify its commitments and interpret them within the context of the international system. Secondary sources were used to provide a historical account of the relationship between the People’s Republic of China and Central American countries, as well as to delineate the geopolitical perspectives that the United States has consolidated in the region.
From a theoretical standpoint, an analytical reflection is undertaken to understand how the phenomenon of strategic competitiveness influences decisions among great powers and how this is projected onto the countries of Central America. To this end, both realist and constructivist approaches in International Relations are reviewed to provide the conceptual foundations for the analysis of the security dynamics between the United States and China.
Although this article does not claim that it is feasible for China to assume the hegemonic role in Central America traditionally ascribed to the United States, it examines the possibility that the country is capitalizing on emerging opportunities to engage in the security sphere, at both the state and private levels, in the countries of the region.
2. Strategic Competition and Its Impact on Central America
Strategic competition is a widely studied phenomenon in International Relations and can be understood by different schools of thought from the perspective of antagonism between actors seeking leadership in the international system. To interpret this phenomenon, antagonistic identities and interests are required, which lead the actors involved to perceive a situation of threat, in response to which they are motivated by the system to adopt measures aimed at consolidating their position or gaining advantages.
For realist schools of thought in International Relations, such threats primarily occur in the material domain, when considering, prospectively, a shift in balance in the military or economic sector that enables challengers to increase their influence and agency in the international system. In the long term, this dynamic could translate into a strategic vulnerability in relation to self-interests, thereby generating tension between the ambitions of security-emphasized by defensive realists as Waltz-or power, as advocated by offensive realists as Mearsheimer.
According to Paul (2016), realism considers that hegemonic transitions are unlikely to occur peacefully. In fact, contemporary historical cases show that the international order has consolidated after the world wars. Thus, for realists, the scenario of strategic competitiveness conditions a new military confrontation. In this line of reasoning, Paul mentions that competition occurs simultaneously in four dimensions: ideological, territorial, economic, and institutional. The author also states that the possibility of a peaceful hegemonic transition depends on the capacity of competing actors to peacefully accommodate their interests across all these dimensions.
In the case of China and the United States, both continuities and oppositions are evident across these dimensions. The possibility of reaching consensus and advancing effective diplomacy to reduce tensions depends on the capacity of political leadership and systemic conditions.
In the ideological domain, there is a confrontation between the capitalist and communist foundations of political systems and individual liberties embraced by each actor. Although China develops a centralized, statedriven capitalist economy that enables its model to give rise to dynamics of interdependence with Western economies, distrust of its political system continues to be perceived as a threat, particularly because it may serve as an attractive model for autocratic leaders.
In the territorial sphere, China has extensive, vulnerable, and porous borders, and faces challenges that include the activities of extremist and secessionist groups; these are factors that help explain why this power reaffirms the classical principle of sovereignty. Likewise, China has typically opposed interventionist doctrines, particularly promoted by the United States. In this domain, Russia is worth mentioning as a power that has violated this principle through the war against Ukraine; Israel has done so as well, through its ongoing military operations in Palestine. In addition, with the second Trump Administration, revisionist or “imperialist” policies have been promoted with regard to the principle of sovereignty, in particular, through statements concerning the Panama Canal, Canada, or Greenland, which is a dimension of significant dispute in the contemporary context.
In the economic sector, there is intense rivalry, especially due to China’s increasing influence and recognition following the 2008 financial and economic crisis, as well as its vast domestic market, which provides a competitive advantage over other actors. The United States has intensified its tone in the economic and commercial domain. In this context, a profound questioning of multilateralism emerged, and a trade war with China broke out. This situation is therefore expected to lead to a scenario marked by tensions. For neoliberal and institutionalist realists, economic power is considered “fungible,” which means that it can be converted into a military advantage by enabling its holder to make significant investments or acquire equipment and technology.
Finally, in the institutional dimension, U.S.-China tensions have been framed around the U.S. critiques of international institutions where China holds an important or growing presence, such as the World Trade Organization, or in the international financial institutions that have allowed the Asian power to increase or strengthen its position. During the second Trump administration, these critiques of institutions persist, which could undermine trust in public international law and peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms.
For realist schools, strategic competitiveness is a forecast of future tensions. Therefore, actors in the international system must adopt measures that allow them to guarantee their national interests. This imperative also applies to Central American countries, which face pressure to define their positions, especially when extra-regional powers such as China or Russia seek to expand their influence in the region.
Moreover, for the constructivist perspective, strategic competition exists in a context where actors are perceived as “rivals” or “enemies” (Wendt, 1999). Since the system enables aggressive behavior that may undermine the international order, the absence of trust leads to the adoption of measures to secure self-interests. These behaviors rest on a set of assumptions, including the perception that actors involved may obtain a better position to pursue their interests. According to Wendt (1999), these may be “objective” interests-such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, and economic security-or “subjective” interests or preferences, such as the primacy of their ideas and values in central institutions or global governance.
The context of anarchy and the perception of threat or rivalry directed at China by the West have motivated China to present alternative narratives to the international community. Examples of such representations include NATO’s characterization of China in its 2022 Strategic Concept as “a systemic and geostrategic challenge to Euro-Atlantic security” (Jiménez Álvarez, 2022), as well as the United States, through its Southern Command, identifying China as a “malign influence” in Latin America. These alternative narratives seek to challenge China’s portrayal as a rival or enemy of the West or the United States and to reduce the threat perception generated by conventional narratives in the field of International Relations. As will be seen below, China has developed several global initiatives, including the Global Security Initiative, to express its commitment to peace and multilateralism.
However, China has also sought to ensure that its identity as a global power is increasingly recognized by promoting cooperation and investment initiatives around the world. These include an expanded presence in Africa and Latin America (for example, the Chancay Megaport in Peru) and an increased presence in international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In turn, it continues to consolidate its political model, its economy, and offers important advances in scientific and technological competition. In this regard, as Santos (2020) notes, the United States perceives “an urgent need to neutralize China’s leadership in four areas: mobile phone manufacturing, fifth-generation telecommunications (AI), electric vehicles, and renewable energy” (pp. 26-27).
In this context, China has engaged in what is referred to as “assertive diplomacy” (Calderón, 2022) as a means of countering narratives that challenge its leadership in the world or combating what it deems “fake news.” This approach has led China to take positions on debates occurring within States, specifically in Latin America, which may challenge the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs.
The United States has also faced an internal debate on China between Trump’s aggressive and nationalist positions, versus Biden’s continuist and institutionalist positions, trying to contain this power either through coercive diplomacy and unilateral sanctions or through institutions and interdependence. One specific case is the return of Donald Trump to the White House (2025-2029), where it is possible to visualize a new era of direct political and commercial disputes with China, framed by a geopolitical narrative that seeks to “recover” economic security and “restore” U.S. leadership.
In this regard, the situation in Central America is complex, as the region has been considered a zone of geopolitical influence and U.S. hegemonic leadership in contemporary history. Consequently, the possibilities for a formal Chinese presence in the region have depended on the agency of governments and the U.S. interest in, or concern about, the presence of extra-regional actors in its immediate sphere, including Russia. In this era of global competitiveness, major powers pursue secure access to raw materials, which are essential for industrial, military, and technological superiority, to ensure their logistical and mobility capabilities and maintain their economic footprint, for which Central America offers significant advantages.
Regarding raw materials, González Hernández (2013) noted that:
Mexico possesses mineral resources including silver, coal, iron, gold, copper, lead, sulfur, mercury, and zinc. Abundant reserves of oil and natural gas, with some of the largest in the world, are located near the Bay of Campeche. The continent as a whole is characterized by its rich biological diversity. In the case of Central America, there are deposits of minerals such as gold, silver, lead, zinc, copper, iron, natural gas, methane hydrates (…), nickel, petroleum, and bauxite (pp. 109-110).
Despite this, Portada, Lem & Paudel (2020) argue that “while China pursues access to raw materials across Latin America, the resources China seeks are not available in Central America. China stands to gain critical strategic advantages by building a stronghold in the American backyard and pursuing the “oneChina” policy. However, such blatant geostrategic moves have now drawn the attention of the United States” (p. 567).
Strategic competitiveness in Central America is fundamentally a geopolitical phenomenon. For China, it is associated with the implementation of the “One-China” policy, pushing back Taiwan, an effort that has made important advances since 2007. In terms of international trade, the region’s high level of dependence on the United States also presents an opportunity for China to solidify its access to the North American market in an era marked by nationalism and economic revisionism, in addition to satisfying the interests of both sides, and the presence of actors that challenge U.S. foreign policy, such as Nicaragua, along with the proximity of Cuba and Venezuela, and the importance of the Panama Canal for global logistics.
3. The Global Security Initiative: A Global Narrative with Regional Impact
In the international system of the 21st century, there has been a transition of systemic power from the unipolar order in the context of the post-Cold War and the global War on Terror to a multipolar order. This transition has been marked by the rise and recognition of other powers, including Asian powers-such as China and India-in the framework of the 2008 financial and economic crisis. It also includes Russia, the European Union that seeks to recover its geopolitical role through initiatives such as the Global Gateway, and even the Global South. This growing recognition of China as a major power explains its interest in positioning “global initiatives” that offer narratives that challenge the Western worldview, one of which is the Global Security Initiative.
Security is a highly contested concept in the field of International Relations, as it is not a neutral category (Cox, 1993). Its definition privileges certain actors, values, and means for its attainment, and it inherently includes the use of force (Buzan & Waever, 1998 and 2003). Likewise, according to David (2008), when examining the definition of security from a Western perspective, three parameters must be considered: the preservation of core values for the whole community, the absence of threats, and the formulation of political objectives.
When the People’s Republic of China enunciates its Global Security Initiative, from an academic interpretation, it is appropriate to ask: Which actors are privileged? What core values are preserved or protected? What threats are identified? And what political objectives are pursued? Interpreting this initiative must take into account the strategic competence with the United States and the different stages of its international projection. Thus, at least three distinct periods can be identified:
Between 1990 and 2008, China’s discourse focused on positioning its “peaceful rise”, aimed at dispelling suspicions during a critical moment marked by the consolidation of U.S. primacy and China’s strategic weakness, culminating in the economic and financial crisis (Méndez-Coto, 2016).
Since 2008, an “assertive diplomacy” has begun to be accentuated (Calderón, 2022) as a mechanism to defend self-interests and introduce alternative narratives to what is labeled as “fake news.” This diplomacy also has an offensive dimension, in the sense of more vigorously advancing issues where greater leadership and international ties are sought, among them, the Belt and Road Initiative.
Since 2021, global initiatives were launched, including the “Global Development Initiative” (September 2021), the “Global Security Initiative” (April 2022, during the annual meeting of the Boao Forum for Asia), and the “Global Civilization Initiative” (March 2023). According to Cerda Dueñas (2024), these initiatives reflect the current features of the Xi Doctrine, through which a new role can be discerned by advancing “global” narratives that challenge the dominant ideas and values in the international system.
The Global Security Initiative (GSI) was launched in the context of the war between Russia and Ukraine. In this programmatic document, China “urges countries to adapt to the profound changes in the international landscape with a spirit of solidarity, and to address complex and interrelated security challenges with a win-win mindset.” It also notes that the GSI “aims to eliminate the root causes of international conflicts, improve global security governance, promote joint international efforts to bring greater stability and predictability to a volatile and changing era, and promote lasting peace and development in the world” (GSI, 2023).
This document consists of six commitments, twenty cooperation priorities, and five platforms for cooperation. This study focuses on the commitments through content analysis, offering a brief synthesis and a critical reflection informed by Western conceptions of security, problematizing the questions initially raised in this section.
Commitment 1: A Vision of Common, Comprehensive, Cooperative, and Sustainable Security
The GSI advocates for a “common security concept, respecting and safeguarding the security of each country-it is a holistic approach, maintaining security in both traditional and non-traditional settings-,” “resolving conflicts through development and eliminating the breeding grounds of insecurity.” It adds that “security will be firm and sustainable only when it is based on morality, justice, and right ideas” (GSI, 2023).
The notion of common security in the past referred to reciprocal protection among allies. The GSI proposal criticizes alliances and implies that states will altruistically pursue each other’s security, which is problematic in a world with numerous ongoing internal and international conflicts-SIPRI (2024) notes that there were 52 in 2023. Moreover, “development” is a multifaceted phenomenon that cannot be regarded as a tool for peace as if there were a single, univocal notion of it. On the contrary, in critical development studies, this can be seen as a source of inequality. Lastly, the invocation of morality, justice, and right ideas presupposes a universal consensus on values, an assumption widely contested in sociology (Merlé, 1997), and currently reflected in prevailing tensions in the world, such as the interpretations from the Global North and the Global South of the events in Palestine and Israeli military operations (Minh, 2024).
Commitment 2: Respect for the Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of All Countries
Previously, the importance of territory and sovereignty as critical elements for the possibility of peaceful accommodation in the international system was analyzed. For China, “all countries, large or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are equal members of the international community”, and “their internal affairs do not admit external interference,” which includes “their right to independently choose social systems and development paths” (GSI, 2023).
It defends the classical principle of sovereignty and equality of States beyond the legal domain, culminating in the affirmation of peoples’ right to self-determination, a central tenet for the Global South, as heir to the decolonization process. Western realism distinguishes between the “juridical” and “factual” dimensions of power: while legal equality exists, forces that differentiate the possibilities of states’ agency are at work. Furthermore, from a Western perspective, liberal democracy has been idealized as a political model over other systems, which continues to generate ideological tensions.
Commitment 3: Adherence to the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter
It recognizes that the Charter is “the institutional design of humanity for collective security and lasting peace,” and attributes current global confrontations and injustices to insufficient application of purposes and principles. It states that “the Cold War mentality, unilateralism, bloc confrontation and hegemonism contradict the spirit of the UN Charter and must be resisted and rejected” (GSI, 2023).
Through this commitment, it stands against the policy of alliances and blocs, as well as unilateral measures. This dynamic of international politics has been practiced at various times, with alliances such as NATO persisting within a multipolar order, which is perceived as problematic from this perspective. It also endorses the centrality of the United Nations in managing security and common problems.
Commitment 4: Address the Legitimate Security Concerns of All Countries
Based on a broad interpretation of indivisibility, it states that “humanity is an indivisible security community,” where “all countries are equal in terms of security interests,” and that “legitimate and reasonable security concerns of all countries must be taken seriously and adequately addressed.” It also declares that security is indivisible, be it individual and collective security, traditional and non-traditional security, security rights and obligations, and security and development (GSI, 2023).
This reasoning rejects the security dilemma, refusing to distinguish between the individual and the collective, between the self and the other. It places all security interests on an equal footing and presumes that security problems are interconnected. From the perspective of instrumental rationality, this proposal raises more difficulties, as the conceptualization of processes is usually based on difference or otherness. It is complex to discern a model that advocates State predominance, where the concept of humanity in general is appealed to. Moreover, placing all security interests on equal footing can render it impractical to identify rivals, insofar as security requires a threat to be identified.
Commitment 5: Peaceful Resolution of Disputes Through Dialogue
It recognizes that “war and sanctions are not a fundamental solution to disputes; only dialogue and consultation are effective in resolving differences” (GSI, 2023). It calls on countries to increase mutual trust on security matters.
This commitment reinforces the rejection of unilateral or coercive measures and emphasizes the need to address the root causes of conflicts.
Commitment 6: Safeguarding Security in Both Traditional and Non-Traditional Domains
It states that today, “both the intent and the scope of security are expanding,” as “traditional and non-traditional security threats have become intertwined.” It calls for strengthened global governance and urges all actors “to work together to address regional disputes and global challenges, such as terrorism, climate change, cybersecurity, and biosafety” (GSI, 2023). This commitment by China reaffirms that security is a multidimensional and multi-causal phenomenon, extending beyond the military sphere, with cooperation as a fundamental aspect for addressing it and identifying concrete threats.
Finally, among the GSI’s cooperation priorities, one of particular relevance is the ninth. It aims to support Latin American and the Caribbean countries in fulfilling the declaration of the Zone of Peace, as well as to assist CELAC and other regional and subregional organizations to play “an active role in the maintenance of regional peace and security and in the proper management of regional hotbeds of tension” (2023).
By conducting a critical analysis of the proposal and responding to the initial conceptualization, the GSI, as a whole, has a state-centric foundation, as countries are called to cooperate and support the commitments. The core values it seeks to preserve have a universalist orientation, since “the issue of security affects the well-being of people in all countries.” Concrete threats identified include regional insecurity hotspots, conflicts and local instabilities, unilateralism and protectionism, traditional and non-traditional threats, as well as global challenges such as terrorism, climate change, cybersecurity, and biosecurity. Its political objectives include defending peace, promoting global development and prosperity, eliminating the root causes of international conflicts, improving global security governance, and enhancing stability and predictability.
From the Americas, important criticisms of the Initiative have emerged. These include the omission of hemispheric security mechanisms, notably the Organization of American States (Ellis, 2023), which was established under the United Nations mandate to create these regional mechanisms to manage security. The Initiative also lacks any mention of “democracy” and “human rights,” concepts that are so relevant to Western and Latin American countries. In the region, even legal and political instruments link democracy and security, constituting
a paradigm developed in the wake of decades of military dictatorships and sys tematic human rights violations (Herz, 2008).
Notably, China has developed an approach that seeks to position itself as a “non-threatening actor.” This stems from Western realist thought, which argues that, vis-à-vis emerging powers, alliances must be developed to prevent their rise, or even “systemic wars” to avoid their primacy. To counter this hegemonic narrative, China has constructed a framework in which it is not perceived as an existential threat, aiming to neutralize the impetus for hard alliances against its interests, or to promote understandings that legitimize coercive responses.
In the context of strategic competition, Central American States have been recipients of the initiatives proposed by China and have become involved in the dynamics of their diplomatic relations with the Asian power. Overall, there is no unified regional policy toward China, as not all countries maintain diplomatic relations with Beijing at the time of this analysis. However, the possibilities of deepening cooperation in military and security matters, as mentioned, will likely be shaped by the policies and restrictions imposed by the United States during the second Trump administration.
4. China’s Engagement in Security Affairs with Central America
As previously noted, China’s interest in establishing a presence in the region responds to geopolitical and diplomatic dynamics, considering Central America’s potential for commercial dynamism and cooperation in technical and financial matters. In part, this relates to easy access for oil transportation from the Atlantic to the Pacific, its refining in Central American facilities, the shipment of goods to the United States, and the manufacture of goods for the Chinese market (Dussel, Armony, & Cui, 2018).
In terms of security and defense, the United States remains the principal regional reference. Therefore, China’s military diplomacy and security has been limited and primarily focused on members of the Bolivarian Alliance, such as Nicaragua, Cuba, and Venezuela (Ellis, 2024a). However, China has recognized its interest in Central American security in its White Papers-documents outlining China’s foreign policy towards Latin America-highlighting the importance of legal security through judicial and police cooperation with the region on several occasions (Xinhua, 2016; China.org.cn, 2008). Consequently, security links are not subject to the Global Security Initiative; instead, this can serve as a catalyst or framework for its efforts.
One of the elements to consider in understanding China’s influence on security in Central America is the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations, which, consequently, led to the severing of ties with Taiwan and the affirmation of the “One China” principle. For the Chinese Communist Party, Taiwan is perceived as a threat to national security. As such, Beijing employs economic and trade strategies to promote bilateral relations (Lemus-Delgado & Cerda, 2021).
According to Aguilera (2006), countries in the region maintained the recognition of the Republic of China before the end of the 1949 revolution, which formalized the government’s relocation to the island of Formosa. In the ensuing years, especially during the Cold War, under U.S. influence, the region strengthened its relations with Taiwan in areas such as security, defense, culture, and infrastructure. Beyond bilateral and multilateral cooperation, this relationship benefited Central American integration organizations and enhanced the international projection of Central American countries.
However, by the early 21st century, China had begun to be recognized as one of the leading powers in the global economic order, which generated incentives within political sectors to expand and diversify relations, insofar as such engagement could yield tangible benefits. As will be analyzed below, China’s diplomatic consolidation in Central America began in 2007 with Costa Rica. As of this analysis, nearly the entire regional bloc has turned to China, with the exceptions of Belize and Guatemala, which continue to maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan. What follows is an overview of the motives and instances of security cooperation provided by the Chinese Government to each country in the region, with the aim of identifying the depth and characteristics of the relationship.
4.1 Costa Rica
During Óscar Arias Sánchez’s second administration, Costa Rica sought to diversify commercial and political partners to “configure itself as a hub for investments, technological innovation and financial dynamism” (Trejos, 2009). Consequently, in June 2007, it became the first country in the region to sever diplomatic relations with Taipei; Nicaragua had re-established relations with Taiwan in the 1990s.
Upon adopting the “One China” policy, relations between the People’s Republic of China and Costa Rica yielded tangible results in a short time, securing the first instances of non-reimbursable financial and technical cooperation in areas such as security, road infrastructure, and emergency response needs, for which an estimated USD 130 million was allocated (Trejos, 2009; La Nación, 2008).
During Laura Chinchilla Miranda’s administration, since 2010, security re mained a priority in the negotiation of cooperation projects with China. Noteworthy is the donation of 350 police vehicles between 2008 and 2012 to improve security in provincial capitals and major municipalities of the country, a contribution valued at USD 8 million (La Nación, 2009; Díaz, 2017). China also donated two propeller aircraft to the Air Surveillance Service of the Ministry of Public Security (MSP), valued at USD 18 million (MREC, 2015).
In 2017, following a commitment made during President Chinchilla’s 2012 visit to Beijing (MAG, 2016), the Chinese Government donated a state-of-the-art facility to the MSP for the establishment of a National Police Academy. Since then, the academy has trained candidates for various bodies such as the Public Force, the Air Surveillance Service, and the National Coast Guard Service (Jiménez, 2017).
In recent years, developments in cybersecurity have strained this cordial relationship of cooperation. China is considered one of the most influential nations in this field at the global level, alongside the United States and Russia, leading in surveillance and trade (Voo, Hemani & Cassidy, 2022). It is understandable for China to prioritize cybersecurity cooperation with its diplomatic partners.
In 2022, various Costa Rican institutions were targeted by cyberattacks from the Conti Group and Hive Ransomware Group (Cabezas, 2022; Orjuela, 2022; Ávalos, 2022). This situation prompted the administration of Rodrigo Chaves Robles (2022-2026), which has demonstrated maintaining a closer alignment with U.S. interests, to issue a decree excluding any national company from countries that have not signed the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime from selling and supplying 5G technology in Costa Rica (Cordero, 2023), thus barring the Chinese company Huawei. In response, the Chinese Embassy in Costa Rica issued public statements defending its position, alleging that the Costa Rican government and media were spreading disinformation (Embajada de China en Costa Rica, 2023a and 2024).
In retrospect, it is worth noting that cooperation with China on security initially provided tangible, immediate, and lasting benefits. Under the Chaves Robles administration, divergent criteria between the two governments have reduced the scope of security collaboration. For instance, the 2023 report by the Embajada de China en Costa Rica (2023b) omits references to citizen security initiatives. Under the second Trump administration, the Chaves Robles government has taken steps toward alignment with the United States, as in February 2025, foreign nationals in deportation proceedings from the United States were received in Costa Rica, while Costa Rican political figures denounced visa cancellations.
4.2 Panama
The development of China’s economic power gradually led other states in the region to consider the geostrategic advantages of consolidating relations with Beijing. Under President Juan Carlos Varela, Panama became the following country to break ties with Taiwan, formalizing diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China on June 13, 2017, via a joint communiqué.
The commercial connectivity attributed to the Panama Canal is one of China’s core interests in the region. In the process of developing projects under the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as the Modern Silk Road, Panama’s largest economic asset strengthens China’s global trade development through diplomatic ties (MFA, 2017). It is worth noting that the People’s Republic of China is the only member of the UN Security Council that has not signed the Protocol to the Treaty concerning the Neutrality of the Panama Canal, a fact that has raised concerns about Panamanian sovereignty in recent years.
Although Panama has not signed security agreements with China, signs of this have been present before the formalization of diplomatic relations, including a meeting between security ministers (MIRE, 2017). Since 2016, both countries have conducted a review process to explore the feasibility of applying a “Safe City Shenzhen” model in Panama. This model involves implementing response measures to address security needs with the potential to transform economic development and, thereby, reduce social risk factors in cities, factors understood as triggers of insecurity (GovInsider, 2019).
The Panamanian government partnered with Huawei to build a security center equipped with state-of-the-art technology, aiming to reduce insecurity in the city of Colón. The Security and Emergency Operations Center (C2) was inaugurated in 2018. The center features 291 surveillance towers, high-resolution cameras, panic buttons, AI systems, facial recognition technology, behavioral pattern analysis, and license plate readers (MIRE, 2018a; Embajada de China en Panamá, 2019). The system is interconnected through a data transport network deployed across the city (MIRE, 2018a).
Other instances of security cooperation include the signature of the 2018 extradition treaty for individuals claimed by either country for prosecution or sentence enforcement (MIRE, 2018b), and the donation in 2023 of 6,000 bulletproof vests and 6,000 protective helmets to Panamanian security forces (Policía Nacional, 2023).
Additionally, in the private sector, Zhongbao Huaan Security Company has es tablished operations in Panama, Costa Rica, and El Salvador. It “explores and implements the Belt and Road Initiative and provides services abroad (...) to provide protection and security assurance.” As in Panama, the Central American region is also found in Costa Rica and El Salvador. This company is one of those recommended by the Security and Protection Industry Association, which was founded by the Ministry of Public Security of China, for overseas security services (ODI Promotion Shanghai, n.d.).
While there have been relatively few instances of a security relationship between China and Panama over the past eight years, recently, technology has emerged as a leverage tool to reduce insecurity in areas predetermined by the Panamanian government, as exemplified by the Security and Emergency Operations Center in Colón. The connection between the two countries in terms of investment, trade, and development is particularly noteworthy. However, this specific example should be considered as a potential case study of the implementation of Chinese surveillance procedures in Latin American cities.
Finally, it should be noted that significant tensions arose over the government’s proposal to build the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Canal Zone, sparking citizen protest movements and heightened political tensions. In this regard, President Varela stated that “the United States is the Canal’s main user, China is the second, and it is part of public life to make the right decisions in the interest of the people…” while denying “tensions with Washington due to relations with China” (Metrolibre, 2019).
Security-related tensions escalated further after Donald Trump declared his ambition to reclaim the Panama Canal under a geopolitical premise of national security and as a critique of China’s presence in the region. This statement was met with strong opposition from Panama and Latin American countries, raising concerns about sovereignty and territorial integrity (BBC, 2024). In this renewed context of geopolitical tensions, the Panamanian Government decided not to renew its participation in the Belt and Road Initiative, signaling a shift away from China (Diálogo Americas, 2025). Moreover, CK Hutchison, the Hong Kong-based business conglomerate that manages ports on both sides of the Canal, is in the process of selling these assets to a U.S. business consortium headed by BlackRock (New York Times, 2025), further illustrating pressure on regional States.
4.3 El Salvador
On August 21, 2018, Foreign Minister Carlos Castañeda and his then counterpart, Wang Yi, signed a joint communiqué announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations between El Salvador and the People’s Republic of China (MFA, 2018a). This event, motivated by commercial and economic interests, served as justification for tipping the balance in favor of Beijing2, officially ending 77 years of diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
Former President Salvador Sánchez stressed, during his visit to Beijing, that, for El Salvador, “China is the ally on the road to development,” while expressing the country’s interest in participating in the construction of the Belt and Road (MFA, 2018b). After his election in 2019, President Nayib Bukele demonstrated his commitment to China in a meeting with President Xi Jinping, pledging to increase cooperation in the country (MFA, 2019a).
It is worth noting that this moment of El Salvador’s interaction with China occurred in a scenario where Bukele’s main policy was the pacification of what was then considered the most violent country in Latin America. Simultaneously, the first Trump administration had neglected relations with the Northern Triangle (Najar, 2019), contributing to a growing rift in U.S.-El Salvador relations (McFarland, 2021).
The Chinese Government has developed its bilateral cooperation with El Salvador. However, to date, the Salvadoran authorities have not specified the flow data in terms of security (Expediente Abierto, 2023). In 2020, a delegation from the People’s Liberation Army visited El Salvador’s military academy. Despite various offers from Chinese authorities involving different forms of security commitments, El Salvador rejected these proposals (Ellis, 2021).
According to the Chinese ambassador to the country, negotiations over the terms of security cooperation have been stimulated, and a military attaché has recently been appointed to El Salvador (Yanhui, quoted in López, 2024). This movement aims to promote the exchange of training and capacity-building between the two countries and initiate military cooperation, rather than merely providing weapons, transport vehicles, and defense equipment.
Among the most recent developments, El Salvador sent technical personnel to China to study the practices of technological application and artificial intelligence for enhancing public security (Xinhua Español, 2024). This measure is in line with restrictive policies aimed at reducing disruptions to peace in the country and may be used to reinforce Bukele’s state of emergency regime. Government institutions and media sources cited above confirm that the China-El Salvador security relationship has been highly specific in terms of military training for Salvadoran officers and the provision of technological equipment for law enforcement. During Trump’s second administration, Bukele positioned himself as a reliable U.S. ally by agreeing to receive dangerous foreign nationals undergoing deportation proceedings from the United States on Salvadoran soil.
4.4 República Dominicana
The Dominican Republic became China’s first commercial partner in the Caribbean, officially establishing diplomatic relations on May 1, 2018. The potential for international cooperation in sectors such as education, tourism, agriculture, sports, and new possibilities for commercial exchanges were key motivations for ending nearly seven decades of strong association with Taipei.
The Dominican Republic signed an agreement with China to receive free assistance through their respective ministries of national defense. A one-time donation valued at 50 million yuan included eight military all-terrain vehicles and 140 motorcycles for the Armed Forces and the National Police, delivered at the beginning of Luis Abinader’s administration. This agreement followed a visit by the Deputy Director General of the Chinese Office for International Military Cooperation to the country, during which cooperation was pledged to both institutions (Acento, 2020).
According to Ellis (2023b), within the framework of the Joint Commission for Economic, Commercial and Investment Cooperation, the Dominican Government sent country’s military personnel to Xinjiang to participate in an international sniper competition, where they were tested on skills such as infiltrating enemy lines, rescuing hostages, shooting from aquatic environments, among others. Likewise, defense officials have traveled to China to participate in educational and military training programs.
The Dominican Minister for Regional Integration Policies stated that, within the framework of closer ties with China, the country could contribute to reducing crime (Xinhua Español, 2023a). In the private sector, companies such as Hikvision and Dahua have sold surveillance cameras and security system components, including to the Dominican government.
As China’s main ally in the Caribbean, the Dominican Republic’s strategic location enhances China’s regional presence under the Belt and Road Initiative. This interest is shared by the United States; however, this country has a longerstanding relationship with the Dominican Republic in terms of security and defense. According to Ellis (2023b), Americans only seek to ensure a transparent relationship in this area, so no threat to the power in terms of its influence on the island is perceived.
4.5 Honduras
President Xiomara Castro announced, as part of her government plan, her intention to formally establish diplomatic relations between Honduras and the People’s Republic of China (Partido Libre, 2022). Honduras announced the establishment of diplomatic ties by signing a joint statement in Beijing on March 26, 2023. The countries established relations aimed at promoting various Honduran products in the Chinese market, educational exchanges, journalism training, and other areas.
As a direct reference to the topic of this study, during her state visit to China, President Castro confirmed that Honduras had agreed to join the Global Security Initiative (Poder Popular, 2023). Consequently, this suggests that the Honduran government is aware of what the Initiative entails in terms of its influence on Latin American countries.
Of the documents signed by the two countries and held by the Honduran Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, two pertain directly to security. In the Framework Agreement on Cooperation in Science, Technology, and Innovation (2023), one of the areas of cooperation through 2033 involves smart buildings of the “Smart City” type. However, at the time of this study, no official communication confirming the commencement of construction on these facilities could be found. In this vein, Honduras has also announced that both countries are committed to building a secure cyberspace (Gobierno solidario, 2024), referencing Huawei as the provider of the necessary technology (Poder Popular, 2023).
4.6 Nicaragua
In the 1980s, the Sandinista regime recognized the legitimacy of the Asian giant in the context of the Cold War. China had reportedly promised up to USD 20 million in cooperation to Nicaragua by 1986 (Estides & Schneider in Schneider & Golombiewski, 2023). However, successive Nicaraguan presidents remained ambivalent, alternating diplomatic ties between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China, depending on who was in power and the perceived advantages of aligning with the interests of the moment.
With the election of Daniel Ortega in 2006, expectations arose regarding the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with China, partly due to the distancing from Washington. Nonetheless, relations between the two countries were not formally reestablished until December 9, 2021. In this regard, Chinese Ambassador to Nicaragua, Chen Xi (2022), emphasized the ideological affinities between the ruling political parties and confirmed Nicaragua’s participation in the GSI.
It is important to note that when Ortega first came to power, Taiwan was providing the Nicaraguan armed forces with approximately USD 2 million annually and non-reimbursable aid to the foreign service, the army, and the police (Rodríguez, 2012). This has led to speculation that Nicaragua would seek to maintain similar support from China. Over the past two years, the countries have signed a joint declaration specifically referring to their union to strengthen cooperation in peace and security, through personnel exchanges and technological training (La Gaceta, 2023).
Ortega also appointed a military, naval, and air defense attaché to the Nicaraguan Embassy in China (Infobae, 2023). The director general of Nicaragua’s National Police met with his Chinese counterpart to explore possibilities of establishing agreements for police training, crime prevention and investigation, and the use of technologies to combat organized crime, drug trafficking, cybercrime, and terrorism (TN8, 2023), as outlined in the GSI. Nicaragua has also participated in international security forums in China. The diplomatic relationship is founded on the pursuit of mutual strategic benefits. Most recently, the two presidents announced that China-Nicaragua relations would be elevated to a level of a “strategic partnership” (Xinhua Español, 2023b).
The consolidation of ties has strengthened a relationship that, until 2021, had been interrupted on several occasions due to political factors. Noting that Nicaragua remains a cautious country about what it shares in security matters, the public sources revised for this section suggest that recent agreements signed with China present a scenario of two countries with compatible ideologies and a growing exchange of knowledge in the security and military domains. It is therefore timely to explore Nicaragua’s intentions on this matter.
4.7 Guatemala
Guatemala has not established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Nevertheless, it remains a strategic country for China in its advance through the Central American region. President Bernardo Arévalo has pledged to maintain relations with Taiwan, despite significant pressure from the People’s Republic of China (Fundación Andrés Bello, 2024) and domestic political sectors. Guatemala also receives significant support from Taiwan in the defense and security sectors (Alexander, 2024; Ellis, 2024b). In this regard, Taipei is trying to preserve its alliance with Guatemala. Notably, in 2024, the People’s Republic of China blocked access to shipments of Guatemalan products, an action interpreted as a sanction in response to the country’s rapprochement with Taiwan (Expediente Público, 2024). This episode highlights the challenges of the geopolitical struggle for the countries of the region and their fragility visà-vis the powers.
4.8 Belize
Belize has not established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. In the past year, despite the pressures it faced, the country reaffirmed its commitment to strong diplomatic ties with Taiwan during President Tsai Ingwen’s last visit to Belmopan, following her tour of Guatemala (Pulido, 2024; Sánchez, 2024). In February 2025, the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) approved a non-reimbursable technical cooperation grant through the Taiwan-CABEI Partnership Trust Fund, as part of the dynamic of maintaining a strong relationship with Taiwan (BCIE, 2025).
5. Final reflections
The purpose of this article has been to interpret the engagement of the People’s Republic of China in Central America within the framework of the Global Security Initiative and strategic competition with the United States. In this regard, the idea of the role China has assumed within the multipolar system of the third decade of the 21st century must be revisited. To that end, its identity as a global power has motivated it to promote ‘global’ narratives, such as the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative.
The Global Security Initiative narrative serves at least two foreign policy purposes. First, it advances a security and defense discourse that distinguishes itself from the canonical Western narrative by reinforcing commitments to global governance, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the rejection of military alliance policies, unilateralism, and protectionism. The ultimate goal is to dismantle the American and European portrayal of China as a “threat” or “security risk.” Second, the Global Security Initiative aims to coordinate the various security and defense efforts that have emerged globally, as well as to establish cooperation priorities and platforms through which resources can be channeled in this domain.
In the case of the region, the strategic competition between China and the United States is a factor with significant implications, especially if Washington increases pressure on regional countries to reconsider their relations with Beijing, as China has successfully positioned itself as a key commercial and diplomatic partner for countries in Central America. Most of these countries now maintain formal relations under the “One China” principle. This has translated into increased cooperation across various domains, including security and defense.
Diplomatic relations with the countries of the region have been one of the priorities on China’s agenda, as the area is not considered a significant source of minerals essential for technological and industrial development, but it does play a role in trade mobility and logistics. It is important to note that diplomatic relations with China extend beyond the scope of the Global Security Initiative, as such relations have been documented since 2007; this has involved agreements and cooperation on security matters. In other words, these security-related relations do not exist because of the launch of the Global Security Initiative; however, they must be interpreted and articulated in light of China’s global aspirations in this domain.
Empirical analysis has revealed that the security-related relations between the States of the region and China are structured around five main axes: (a) the donation and acquisition of arms and equipment; (b) the development of infrastructure; (c) the training and capacity-building in security and defense; (d) the presence of security personnel; and (e) the presence of Chinese private security companies in the region. It is evident that security linkages with China are more limited compared to those with the United States, given the latter’s geopolitical and hegemonic role in the Central American region, which constitutes part of the North American regional security complex (Méndez-Coto, 2020). Nevertheless, the inquiry enabled a closer examination of these security initiatives involving China’s presence, despite the difficulties in accessing information related to security and defense, given the implications for foreign policies and the interests of States.
In this regard, it is worth mentioning that, with respect to the donation and acquisition of arms and equipment, identified donations included patrol vehicles, light aircraft, and bulletproof vests in Costa Rica; vests and helmets in Panama; and vehicles and motorcycles in the Dominican Republic. In relation to infrastructure development, donations include the National Police Academy in Costa Rica, the Security and Emergency Operations Center, and a commitment to a Safe City initiative in Panama, as well as a commitment to developing Smart City-type buildings in Honduras.
Regarding training and capacity-building, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic stood out for sending personnel to China. El Salvador dispatched technical personnel to study and apply artificial intelligence technologies, while the Dominican Republic sent military personnel to participate in competitions and defense officers for military training programs. Concerning the presence of security personnel, it was found that El Salvador appointed a military attaché in the Chinese Embassy, while Nicaragua did the same at its Embassy in Beijing. As for the presence of private security companies, references to Zhongbao Huaan were identified in Costa Rica, Panama, and El Salvador, and to Hikvision in the Dominican Republic.
The presence of extra-regional actors in Central America has fluctuated depending on the level of interest or disinterest shown by the United States in defining its security priorities. Nevertheless, there is evidence indicating that China’s presence has led Washington to exert direct pressure and impose conditions on countries in the region. This is reflected in the case of Costa Rica, through efforts to block Huawei’s participation in 5G technology, and in the case of Panama, through the questioning of China’s presence in the Canal and its use for the transportation of goods. U.S. President Donald Trump has already expressed criticism and asserted hegemonic interests regarding these developments.
For the states of the region, it is crucial to evaluate the implications that the new context of American protectionism and unilateralism may have for their national interests, particularly given their high levels of dependence in the areas of trade, security, and migration. A significant advancement in relations with Beijing, especially in sensitive domains, could result in increased pressure from Washington, whose leadership remains unwilling to accept a growing Chinese influence in the region
