<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>1409-2433</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Revista de Matemática Teoría y Aplicaciones]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Rev. Mat]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>1409-2433</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Centro de Investigaciones en Matemática Pura y Aplicada (CIMPA) y Escuela de Matemática, San José, Costa Rica.]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S1409-24332013000200002</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[El concepto de sensibilidad para el caso discreto del problema de reparto de costos de producción]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Sensibility concept for the discrete case in the cost sharing problem]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hernández]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Luis]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="A01"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Macías Ponce]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Julio César]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="A02"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Sánchez Sánchez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Francisco]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="A03"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="A01">
<institution><![CDATA[,Este trabajo se realizó con apoyo de CONACyT, proyecto 167924  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
</aff>
<aff id="A02">
<institution><![CDATA[,CIMAT A.C.  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ Guanajuato]]></addr-line>
<country>México</country>
</aff>
<aff id="A03">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Autónoma de Aguascalientes  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[Aguascalientes Aguascalientes]]></addr-line>
<country>México</country>
</aff>
<aff id="A04">
<institution><![CDATA[,CIMAT A.C.  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ Guanajuato]]></addr-line>
<country>México</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2013</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2013</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>20</volume>
<numero>2</numero>
<fpage>119</fpage>
<lpage>131</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.sa.cr/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S1409-24332013000200002&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.sa.cr/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S1409-24332013000200002&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.sa.cr/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S1409-24332013000200002&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Supongamos que se produce un vector en forma conjunta. El problema de reparto de costos es el como dividir el costo de producción de este vector entre sus componentes. En este artículo se caracteriza axiomáticamente una solución para este tipo de problemas basados en dos axiomas: s-sensibilidad y separabilidad. El axioma de s-sensibilidad establece como debe cambiar la solución cuando ocurren pequeños cambios en la función de costos y el axioma de separabilidad tiene la conotación tradiconal. Se estudia el caso discreto y se obtiene una solución de manera axiomática.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Suppose that a vector is produced jointly. We will consider the problem of dividing the cost of production among a group of components. In this paper we characterized a solution through two axioms, s-sensibility and separability. The sensibility is a concept related to the variations of a solution due to slight changes of the cost function and the separability is standard. We study the discrete cost sharing problem. We provide a axiomatic solution.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[distribución de costos]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[soluciones axiomáticas]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[soluciones inducidas por caminos]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[juegos cooperativos]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[sensibilidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[cost sharing]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[axiomatic solutions]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[path-induced solutions]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[cooperative games]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[sensibility]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><body><![CDATA[ <div style="text-align: justify; font-family: verdana;">     <div style="text-align: center;"><font style="font-weight: bold;"  size="4">El concepto de sensibilidad para el caso discreto del problema de reparto de costos de producci&oacute;n</font><br  style="font-weight: bold;"> <font style="font-weight: bold;" size="2"></font><br  style="font-weight: bold;"> <font style="font-weight: bold;" size="4">Sensibility concept for the discrete case in the cost sharing problem</font>    <br> </div>     <br>     <div style="text-align: center;"><font size="2">Luis Hern&aacute;ndez Lamoneda<sup><a href="#2">&#8224;</a><a name="5"></a>+</sup>, Julio C&eacute;sar Mac&iacute;as Ponce<sup><a href="#3">&#8225;</a><a name="6"></a>+</sup>, Francisco S&aacute;nchez S&aacute;nchez<sup><a href="#4">&sect;</a><a name="7"></a>+</sup></font>    <br> </div> <font size="2"></font><font size="-1">    <br> <a name="Correspondencia2"></a>*<a href="#Correspondencia1">Direcci&oacute;n para correspondencia:</a></font>    <br> <hr style="width: 100%; height: 2px;"><font style="font-weight: bold;"  size="3">Resumen</font>    <br> <font size="2"></font>    <br> <font size="2">Supongamos que se produce un vector en forma conjunta. El problema de reparto de costos es el como dividir el costo de producci&oacute;n&nbsp; de este vector entre sus componentes. En este art&iacute;culo se caracteriza axiom&aacute;ticamente una soluci&oacute;n para este tipo de problemas basados en dos axiomas: s-sensibilidad y separabilidad. El axioma de s-sensibilidad establece como debe cambiar la soluci&oacute;n cuando ocurren peque&ntilde;os cambios en la funci&oacute;n de costos y el axioma de separabilidad tiene la conotaci&oacute;n tradiconal. Se estudia el caso discreto y se obtiene una soluci&oacute;n de manera axiom&aacute;tica.</font>    ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<br> <font size="2"></font>    <br> <font size="2"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Palabras clave:</span> distribuci&oacute;n de costos, soluciones axiom&aacute;ticas, soluciones inducidas por caminos, juegos cooperativos, sensibilidad.</font>    <br> <font size="2"></font>    <br> <font style="font-weight: bold;" size="3">Abstract</font>    <br> <font size="2"></font>    <br> <font size="2">Suppose that a vector is produced jointly. We will consider the problem of dividing the cost of production among a group of components. In this paper we characterized a solution through two axioms, s-sensibility and separability. The sensibility is a concept related to the variations of a solution due to slight changes of the cost function and the separability is standard. We study the discrete cost sharing problem. We provide a axiomatic solution. </font>    <br> <font size="2"></font>    <br> <font size="2"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Keywords: </span>cost sharing, axiomatic solutions, path-induced solutions, cooperative games, sensibility.</font>    <br> <font size="2"></font>    <br> <font size="2"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Mathematics Subject Classification: </span>91A12, 91A40.</font>    ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<br> <hr style="width: 100%; height: 2px;">    <br> <font size="-1">Contenido disponible en pdf</font>    <br>     <br> <font size="2"></font> <hr style="width: 100%; height: 2px;"><font style="font-weight: bold;"  size="3">Referencias</font>    <br> <font size="2"></font>    <!-- ref --><br> <font size="2">[1] Mac&iacute;as, J.; Olvera, W. (2012) &#8220;A Nash equilibrium solution for the discrete two-person cost sharing problem&#8221;, <span  style="font-style: italic;">Applied Mathematical Sciences</span> 6(42): 2063&#8211;2070.    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[&#160;<a href="javascript:void(0);" onclick="javascript: window.open('/scielo.php?script=sci_nlinks&ref=1941755&pid=S1409-2433201300020000200001&lng=','','width=640,height=500,resizable=yes,scrollbars=1,menubar=yes,');">Links</a>&#160;]<!-- end-ref --></font>    <br>     <!-- ref --><br> <font size="2">[2] Moulin, H. (1995) &#8220;On additive methods to share joint costs&#8221;, <span style="font-style: italic;">The Japanese Economic Review </span>46: 303&#8211;332.    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[&#160;<a href="javascript:void(0);" onclick="javascript: window.open('/scielo.php?script=sci_nlinks&ref=1941758&pid=S1409-2433201300020000200002&lng=','','width=640,height=500,resizable=yes,scrollbars=1,menubar=yes,');">Links</a>&#160;]<!-- end-ref --></font>    ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<br>     <!-- ref --><br> <font size="2">[3] Nouweland, A.; Tijs, S. (1995) &#8220;Cores and related solution concepts for multi-choice games&#8221;, <span style="font-style: italic;">Mathematical Methods of Operations Research</span> 41: 289&#8211;311.    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[&#160;<a href="javascript:void(0);" onclick="javascript: window.open('/scielo.php?script=sci_nlinks&ref=1941761&pid=S1409-2433201300020000200003&lng=','','width=640,height=500,resizable=yes,scrollbars=1,menubar=yes,');">Links</a>&#160;]<!-- end-ref --></font>    <br>     <!-- ref --><br> <font size="2">[4] Sprumont, Y. (2008) &#8220;Nearly serial sharing methods&#8221;, <span style="font-style: italic;">International Journal of Game Theory</span> 37: 155-184.    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[&#160;<a href="javascript:void(0);" onclick="javascript: window.open('/scielo.php?script=sci_nlinks&ref=1941764&pid=S1409-2433201300020000200004&lng=','','width=640,height=500,resizable=yes,scrollbars=1,menubar=yes,');">Links</a>&#160;]<!-- end-ref --></font>    <br> <font size="2"></font>    <br> <font size="-1"><a name="Correspondencia1"></a><a  href="#Correspondencia2">*</a>Correspondencia a:    <br> </font><font size="2">Luis Hern&aacute;ndez Lamoneda. </font><font  size="2">CIMAT A.C., Guanajuato, M&eacute;xico. E-Mail: lamoneda@cimat.mx</font><font size="2">     <br> Julio C&eacute;sar Mac&iacute;as Ponce. </font><font size="2">Universidad Aut&oacute;noma de Aguascalientes, Aguascalientes, Aguascalientes, M&eacute;xico. E-Mail: jlmacias@correo.uaa.mx</font>    ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<br> <font size="2">Francisco S&aacute;nchez S&aacute;nchez. </font><font  size="2">CIMAT A.C., Guanajuato, M&eacute;xico. E-Mail: sanfco@cimat.mx    <br> </font><font size="2">*Este trabajo se realiz&oacute; con apoyo de CONACyT, proyecto 167924.</font>    <br> <font size="2"><a name="2"></a><a href="#5">&#8224;</a>CIMAT A.C., Guanajuato, M&eacute;xico. E-Mail: lamoneda@cimat.mx</font>    <br> <font size="2"><a name="3"></a><a href="#6">&#8225;</a>Universidad Aut&oacute;noma de Aguascalientes, Aguascalientes, Aguascalientes, M&eacute;xico. E-Mail: jlmacias@correo.uaa.mx</font>    <br> <font size="2"><a name="4"></a><a href="#7">&sect;</a>CIMAT A.C., Guanajuato, M&eacute;xico. E-Mail: sanfco@cimat.mx</font>    <br> <font size="-1"></font>     <div style="text-align: center;"> <hr style="width: 100%; height: 2px;"><font style="font-weight: bold;"  size="2">Received: 14/Feb/2012; Revised: 16/May/2013; Accepted: 24/May/2013</font><font size="2"></font>    <br> </div> </div>      ]]></body><back>
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<source><![CDATA[Applied Mathematical Sciences]]></source>
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